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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES*
No. XX-###
REAL FEMINISTS FOR MOTHERHOOD COALITION, PETITIONER V.
VIRGINIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[May 4, 2011]
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE ROBERTS, and JUSTICES BREYER, STEVENS, and THOMAS joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS filed a concurring opinion, in which JUSTICE
THOMAS joined. JUSTICE SCALIA filed a dissenting opinion, in which
JUSTICE ALITO joined. JUSTICE GINSBERG filed a dissenting opinion, in
which JUSTICE SOUTER joined.
Since this Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973,1 we received numerous
requests to reconsider the validity of that ruling or to otherwise limit its
application. Petitioner renews this request, asking us to discard our
much maligned and now limited Roe doctrine. After struggling with this
issue for nearly forty years, we are struck by the wisdom of Justice
O'Connor's statement, "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt."'2 We could not agree more and, therefore, lay the issue of abor-
tion law to rest by overruling this Court's prior decision in Roe v. Wade.
This opinion follows in three parts. First, we consider Petitioner's pro-
cedural posture and the constitutional challenge of Roe v. Wade. Sec-
ond, we lay out a historical roadmap of abortion jurisprudence from Roe
v. Wade to the present. These cases reveal an unreliable and certainly
unpredictable standard in the abortion context. Finally, we conclude
with the rationale to support our decision to overrule Roe v. Wade.
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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A. Petitioner
Real Feminists for Motherhood Coalition ("Real Feminists") is a
nonprofit organization aimed at educating and helping underprivileged,
pregnant teenagers in the metropolitan Richmond area. The focus of
the organization is aimed directly at pre-natal and post-natal care for
qualifying women. Real Feminists assert that the main goal of the orga-
nization is to help pregnant women who think the only realistic choice
is to have an abortion. The Organization's mission statement declares:
"Real Feminists for Motherhood is a non-partisan group aimed at ena-
bling the lives of women and helping each woman reach her full poten-
tial even when adversity tries to defeat motherhood. Through educa-
tion, financial assistance, and positive legislation, all women can warmly
embrace motherhood. '3 Members of the organization spend a signifi-
cant portion of their time lobbying, both with representatives in the
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia and with private
investors. The lobbying efforts of the organization are dedicated to en-
acting anti-abortion legislation in Virginia with the intent to undermine
this Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade. In 2008, Real Feminists relinquished
their lobbying efforts in favor of furthering their cause by directly chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade and henceforth commenced
this claim. Joining Petitioner as amicus curiae, as it has done in at least
half a dozen other cases over the last decade, is the United States who
again asks us to overrule Roe.
B. Procedural Posture
Petitioner initiated this case in the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, making several distinct yet intertwined arguments.
First, Petitioner argues that the ruling in Roe is unconstitutional after
the Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey.4 Petitioner asserts the decision in Casey changed the Roe
3. Mission Statement of Real Feminists for Motherhood (2002).
4. 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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doctrine by allowing state regulation of abortions before viability as long
as the regulation did not place an undue burden on a woman seeking an
abortion. 5 Second, Petitioner challenges the holding in Roe as violating
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that
due to the vast advancements in medical technology viability of life has
changed since 1973. In the simplest form, Petitioner argues that the
law must catch up with modern medicine, and to do so, Roe must be
overruled to align with the law set forth in Casey.6 Finally, Petitioner
contends the Court's holding in Roe is inconsistent with public policy
and as a result created an unreliable doctrine that has chipped away at
abortion jurisprudence until little law and constitutional standards remain
from our initial holding in Roe.7
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the
case, and Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.8 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision
but did acknowledge agreement with Petitioner on the merits of public
policy holding, "[s]ubstantial changes indeed have occurred since 1973
reflecting shifts in public policy that continue to fuel the abortion de-
bate; however, it is not for this court to decide Roe's continuing valid-
ity."9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal. We
grant certiorari to examine the depleted Roe doctrine and put to rest the
jurisprudence of doubt in the abortion context.
5. See id. at 874.
6. See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
7. See id. at 979.
8. Respondents challenge Petitioner's standing as an organization. Specifically, Respondents assert
that no members of Real Feminists would have standing on his or her own. Thus, the organization, as
a whole, lacks prudential standing. We reject this claim. Real Feminists, as the party asserting a fed-
eral jurisdiction claim, meets all the requirements set forth for organizational standing: (1) at least one
member of Real Feminists would have standing on her own, (2) neither the claim nor relief sought
requires the participation of individual members, and (3) the interest sought to be protected is germane
to the organization. We agree with Petitioner. Real Feminists does have standing to bring this case in
federal court. See generally Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)
(explaining the requirements for organizational standing); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (discussing the requirements of standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 717, 734-
35, 739 (1972) (discussing the injury requirement for organizational standing).
9. _ S.E.2d _ (4th Cir. 2010).
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II
At the outset it should be noted that there is a longstanding history of
law, both on the federal and state level, directed at abortion and its regu-
lation. This longstanding history is by no means one of consistency. In
fact, the history of abortion law is one of doubt contributing to no reli-
ability and certainly no predictability in the law. The ruling in Roe-
that a woman has a right to terminate her pregnancy before viability,
and that a state must satisfy a test of strict scrutiny before any type of
regulation on abortion would be constitutionally permissible 1 -has been
eroded, changed, abused, and dwindled until very little remains intact
from the decision. We find this persuasive evidence as proof that a
right to abortion is not a right that should be crafted by this Court. As
such, we hereby return the regulation of abortion to where it should be-
in the hands of the people.
1973: Roe v. Wade
To understand this Court's final ruling, one must first understand this
Court's longstanding efforts to continuously regulate abortion, by begin-
ning where we started in Roe v. Wade.
In Roe v. Wade, we were presented with a Texas statute,11 one like
those enacted in many States at the time, making all abortions illegal
except those necessary to save the life of the mother.12 Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun began the decision with an extensive review of
the history of abortion law noting particularly the advancements in
medical technology allowing physicians to perform safe abortions.13
Through this historical overview, Justice Blackmun laid the foundation
for the Court's position that the right to privacy does include a
woman's right to abort. 14 But where exactly does the Constitution ex-
10. See Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 163-64 (1973).
11. See id. at 117-18 n.1 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-94, 1196 (Vernon 1971)).
12. See id. at 117-118 n.1 (citing TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 1196).
13. Id. at 129-52 (outlining eight distinct developments that changed and advanced abortion proce-
dures from "ancient attitudes" to the then-current position of the American Bar Association on abor-
tion and three reasons why criminal abortion laws were originally enacted).
14. Id. at 153.
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tend the right to privacy to give a woman the right to choose? The an-
swer was debatable from the beginning. We acknowledged that although
the right to choose an abortion could not be found explicitly in the Con-
stitution and, furthermore, we are not even sure where the proper pro-
tection of the right was located in the Constitution-the decision was
clear that the right nonetheless did exist.15 To add to the uncertainty,
the Court assumed this was not an absolute right, and thus, when met
with strict scrutiny, a state could still regulate abortions. 16
The strongest element of the Roe decision was the test for determin-
ing when a state could assert a compelling interest that would trump a
woman's right to an abortion.1 7 We basically equipped legislators with
an outline on how to draft abortion regulation that would pass the strict
scrutiny test and remain consistent with the ruling in Roe. The regula-
tion of abortion was approached on a trimester basis. When dividing a
pregnancy into trimesters, a delineable test was established for when and
more importantly how abortion regulation was necessary and proper.18
Specifically, the Court held that during the first trimester, the govern-
ment could not prohibit abortion and the only permissible abortion regu-
lation during this trimester was any regulation imposed on other medical
procedures.1 9 Thus, a woman was granted total autonomy over her
pregnancy during the first trimester. 20 In the second trimester, States
15. Id. We stated:
This right to privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty and restrictions upon state action ... or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id.
16. Id. at 154-55 (noting limitations that could apply are those such as a State's interest in protecting
health, medical standards, and prenatal life). The Court created debate surrounding the constitutional
protections by refusing to take a stance on when life begins-at least in the legal context:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary,
at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Id. at 159.
17. Id. at 163.
18. See id. at 164-65.
19. See id. at 163 (noting regulations during the first trimester including requiring abortion physicians
and facilities to be licensed).
20. See id. It should be noted that the Court seemed hesitant to make this conclusion. Instead, the
Court implied that a woman in conjunction with her physician had total autonomy over her pregnancy.
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were afforded more leeway. Abortions could not be prohibited during
the second trimester, but States could impose regulations "reasonably re-
late[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health. ' 21 In the
final trimester, subsequent to viability, abortions could be prohibited ex-
cept where necessary to save the life or health of the mother. 22
After explaining the trimester approach in Section X of the deci-
sion, 23 the Court created a new section, Section XI, dedicated "[t]o
summarize and to repeat" what was set forth in the immediately preced-
ing paragraph. 24 A review of the structure and content of these sections
demonstrates that the trimester approach to abortion regulation was the
Court's interpretation and application of abortion law in the United
States. The problem with this achievement was the trimester approach
was completely devoid of any constitutional foundation.25
The Roe decision was heard and decided along with the much less pub-
licized case of Doe v. Bolton.26 In this companion case, a Georgia stat-
ute regulating abortion was challenged. 27 The statute outlawed abortions
in all but three circumstances: (1) where it was necessary to save the life
of the mother; (2) where the fetus would likely be born with a serious
birth defect; or (3) where the pregnancy resulted from rape. 2  The
Court found the State statute unconstitutional in the face of the trimes-
ter approach set forth in Roe.29
See id. at 163-64. "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion de-
cision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician." Id. at 164. This Court continues to support the importance of physician autonomy and
control. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932, 946-48, 966-70 (2000) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the discretion a physician should
have in selecting the best treatment for their parents, including abortions).
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
22. See id. at 163-64.
23. See id. at 162-64.
24. Id. at 164-66 (summarizing the main points of the case, but oddly focusing only on the trimester
approach and briefly stating the holding of the case).
25. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(overruling the trimester approach in favor of the undue burden standard).
26. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
27. Id. at 182-83.
28. See id. at 183 (referencing GA. CRIM. CODE § 26-1202 (1968)).
29. See id. at 201; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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The decision was flawed from the beginning. Attempts to settle a
deeply controversial debate by alluding to constitutionally undefined ra-
tionales but with clearly demarcated limitations on regulations would
lead to confusion and be destined for challenges. The 7-2 decision in
Roe had a dissenting opinion from Chief Justice Rehnquist, 30 while Jus-
tice White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist on the dissenting side in Doe.31
These dissenters argued that the Constitution should be strictly con-
strued and that the Court should not create new rights not appearing in
the Constitution. 32 The dissents in both Doe and Roe were adamant
that abortion regulation should be left to the legislative process, and his-
tory has proven the wisdom of this approach.33
1989: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
Fifteen years later, this Court belittled, berated, and publicly de-
nounced the Roe decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.34
In this case we were presented with a Missouri Act that declared human
life began at conception and every Missouri state law should be con-
strued to provide unborn children with the same rights as other per-
sons. 35 The Act prohibited the use of state funding or state facilities for
the performance, encouragement, or counseling of an abortion that was
not necessary to save a woman's life.36 The Missouri Act also required
physicians to test for viability of pregnancy believed to be at least
twenty weeks along, and only if the fetus was not viable would an abor-
tion be legal after the twenty weeks of pregnancy. 37 In the plurality
30. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
32. See id.; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Doe, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Douglas wrote individual concurring opinions, and in Roe, Justice Stewart wrote an indi-
vidual concurring opinion. See id. at 207-21 (Burger, C.J., & Douglas, J., concurring); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 167-71 (Stewart, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger suggested that it would be constitutional for
a State to place medical restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion by requiring at least two physi-
cians to certify the abortion. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
33. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting); Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
35. Id. at 504 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1 (1986)).
36. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 188.210, 188.215 (2004).
37. Id. § 188.029.
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opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 38 the constitutionality of the
Missouri Act was affirmed.39
Though there was disdain for Roe's decision, the Webster Court did
not overrule or even consider a thorough review of the Roe doctrine.
Instead, we erroneously added to the doubtful legitimacy of the Roe doc-
trine. The plurality opinion attacked the trimester approach and Roe's
attempt to balance the interest of the mother against that of the
State.40 Instead of creating or suggesting a new method to balance these
conflicting interests, the Court stated that "the rigid Roe framework is
hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms
. . . . The key elements of the Roe framework-trimesters and viabil-
ity-are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else
one would expect to find a constitutional principle. '41 Without overrul-
ing Roe, we recognized the State's legitimate compelling interest in pro-
tecting fetal life from the moment of conception. 42 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia stated the plurality decision effectively overruled
Roe.43
Recognizing the doctrinal shift, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, stated in the dissenting opinion: "Today, Roe v.
Wade and the fundamental constitutional right of women to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are not secure .... For
today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed... [b]ut the signs
are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows. ' 44 We disagree
with Justice Blackmun and the plurality opinion and find that the law of
abortion was disturbed after the decision in Webster. In fact, the changes
left the law in total chaos. The trimester and viability elements-key
to Roe-were changed and stripped from Roe's established framework.
Although the plurality opinion did not explicitly overrule Roe or even
38. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White and Kennedy. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 498-99.
39. See id. at 500-01 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205(1)-(2), 188.029, 188.205, 188.210, 188.215).
The Missouri Act, signed into law in 1986, is comprised of twenty statutory provisions of which five
were before the Court. See id.
40. See id. at 517-19.
41. Id. at518.
42. See id. at519.
43. See id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
44. Id. at 537, 560 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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take a direct challenge of the decision, the harsh criticism and changes
to the doctrine were enough to lead Justice Scalia to believe the decision
would overrule Roe. 45 Did Webster overrule Roe? Justice Scalia thought
so, but the legal academy and lower courts disagreed and continued to
hold Roe and its progeny as the standard for constitutional analysis of
abortion regulation.
1992: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
Five years later, there would be no relief from the jurisprudence of
doubt from our decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.46 In Planned Parenthood's brief for certiorari, only
one question was asked: "Has the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade,
holding that a woman's right to choose abortion is a fundamental right
protected by the United States Constitution?" 47  When the Court
granted certiorari in Casey, it seemed evident that we would reexamine
the doctrine set forth in Roe.48 We were asked to consider the constitu-
tionality of a Pennsylvania statute regulating abortions by requiring,
among other things, a twenty-four hour waiting period, informed con-
sent, parental consent for unmarried minors, and spousal notification
before abortions.49 In a 5-4 decision, this Court reaffirmed the Roe doc-
trine and held that States could not prohibit abortions prior to viabil-
ity. 50 However, after Webster's harsh criticism of Roe, changes had to
be made to the Roe doctrine.
45. See id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia stated
that Roe should be overturned and should be done so more explicitly than the plurality opinion pro-
posed. See id. Justice Scalia further opined that the answer to this critical question belongs to the po-
litical process and not the judicial. See id.
46. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
47. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No.
91-744).
48. Justice O'Connor suggested in Webster that the proper time to reexamine Roe would be presented
when a State attempted or enacted legislation prohibiting a woman from obtaining an abortion. See
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 525-26 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Interestingly, the Pennsylvania statute before the Court in Casey did not
prohibit abortions, but the Court still took this opportunity to reexamine Roe even though they had not
done so in the past with similar state statutes.
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 902-11 app. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3203-3220 (West
1990)).
50. See id. at 845-46 (plurality opinion).
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In Casey, this Court made significant changes to the Roe doctrine by
overruling both the trimester approach and the use of strict scrutiny for
assessing regulations on abortion.51 The joint opinion written by Justice
O'Connor and joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, declared: "We re-
ject the trimester framework . . . . The trimester framework suffers
from these basic flaws: in its formation it misconceives the nature of the
pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalues the State's in-
terest in potential life, as recognized in Roe. '52 As we explained, the di-
viding line between a woman's interest and the State's interest in pro-
tecting fetal life remained fetal viability. 53  Abortions could be
prohibited, after viability, except where necessary to save or protect the
life of the mother. 54 In addition to finessing the viability standard, a
new standard was set forth for evaluating the constitutionality of a state
regulation: the "undue burden" standard. As defined by the Court:
[t]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
55
From the beginning, the plurality claimed that "the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again affirmed. ' 56 Yet, this
gratuitous lip service paid to the Roe doctrine was just a slap in the face
of abortion jurisprudence. Where, in Casey, we claimed to uphold the
essential framework of Roe, what actually resulted was a new doctrine,
replacing the trimester approach with an undue burden test that elimi-
nated the constitutionality test of strict scrutiny for abortion regulation.
The Court's first attempt at applying the new test did not answer the
question: What is an undue burden? When analyzing the Pennsylvania
statute, the joint opinion upheld the twenty-four hour waiting period
51. See id. at 872-73.
52. Id. at 873.
53. See id. at 879 (reaffirming that the government could not prohibit abortions before viability).
54. See id. at 846.
55. Id. at 876-77.
56. Id. at 846.
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and the requirement of informed consent. 57 The Court found the provi-
sion requiring spousal notification before a married woman could receive
an abortion unconstitutional.5 8 Aside from this ruling, the disconcerting
factor remained that the plurality failed to explain an undue burden.
Most succinctly, the joint opinion held that a State could not act with
the purpose of creating obstacles to abortion; or in other words, the
State could not act with the purpose of creating an undue burden on a
woman's right to abortion. 59 But the joint opinion recognized and even
encouraged the State's interest in regulating abortion, noting that "the
State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is informed,
and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as
long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion. ' 60 According to Casey, a State could not create obstacles to
abortion, but it could act with the purpose of discouraging abortion and
encouraging childbirth. But every regulation of abortion was intended to
discourage abortion and encourage childbirth. So, how does an undue
burden distinguish between regulations that are constitutional and those
that are not? The undue burden test has shown no ability to guide this
distinction. 61
The dissenting opinions in Casey did not offer a sound or stable ap-
proach to abortion jurisprudence. Instead, the argument returned to step
one: whether a woman has a constitutionally protected interest in ob-
taining an abortion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion agreed
that women had a protected interest in abortion, but reasoned the State
also had an interest in protecting fetal life from the moment of concep-
tion. 62 Justice Scalia's dissent denied any such constitutional interest ex-
isted in obtaining an abortion. 63 In Casey's only moment of clarity, the
57. See id. at 886-87.
58. See id. at 892-94.
59. See id. at 878.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's application of the undue
burden test to similar statutes banning partial-birth abortions and the different conclusions); see also
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
62. See Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63. See id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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dissenters stated, "[w]e believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it
can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach
to stare decisis in constitutional cases. 64
2000 & 2007: Partial-Birth Abortions
After the 1992 ruling in Casey, we were manifestly bound to interpret
what constituted an undue burden. This opportunity presented itself in
Stenberg v. Carhart65 and Gonzales v. Carhart.66 Perhaps it should
come as no surprise that the undue burden test, applied in both cases, re-
sulted in different conclusions, although the statutes at issue were nearly
identical.
In Stenberg, we addressed a Nebraska statute banning partial-birth
abortions. 67 Specifically, the Nebraska statute focused on the partial-
birth abortion technique known as a dilation and extraction ("D&X"). 68
In a 5-4 vote, there were only two justifications for declaring the state
statute unconstitutional. 69 First, the law did not allow for an exception
to safeguard the health of women.70 The majority defaulted back to Ca-
sey and stated a health exception is necessary for the preservation of
the mother's life.71 The Nebraska statute wanted to invoke the health
exception only in extreme cases where a D&X procedure was the only
way to save the mother's life. However, in Stenberg, the Court opined
that the situation need not be so severe that an abortion is the only way
to preserve the life of the mother.7 2 Second, the Court invalidated the
64. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
65. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
66. 550 U.S. 124, 127 S.Ct 1610 (2007).
67. 530 U.S. at 921-22.
68. See id. Notably, the term "partial-birth" abortion is not a medical term used by many medical
schools or medical journals. Abortion opponents coined the term in the mid 1990s, and it continued to
gain popular use as states enacted partial-birth abortion bans until the federal government stepped in
with the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban of 2003. See also Gail Glidewell, Note, "Partial-Birth" Abortions
and the Health Exception: Protecting Maternal Health or Risking Abortion on Demand?, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1089, 1095 (2001).
69. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 937.
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statute because it failed to meet the undue burden test.7 3 The majority
based the conclusion substantially on the testimony of abortion doctors
who stated that a D&X procedure is the safest method of abortion for
some women.7 4 Thus, restricting a woman's right to the safest method
of abortion placed an undue burden on her right because, if the safest
methods were an unavailable choice, then the woman may not have an
abortion. What seemed clear from this ruling was that any attempt to
regulate or limit an abortion option that potentially dissuaded a woman
from choosing an abortion would fail the undue burden test.
After the ruling in Stenberg, it seemed obvious when President George
W. Bush signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 ("the 2003
Act"), 75 it would fail to pass the muster of the undue burden test. The
2003 Act prohibited any physician from knowingly performing a par-
tial-birth abortion. 76 Specifically, like the Nebraska statute challenged
in Stenberg, the 2003 Act also sought to prohibit D&X and potentially
intact dilution and evacuation ("D&E") procedures.77 The evidence re-
vealed that Congress closely followed our ruling in Stenberg. Through
congressional findings and within the statutory language of the 2003 Act
itself, Congress took great strides to illustrate that abortion procedures,
intended to be prohibited by the 2003 Act, were never medically neces-
sary to save the life of the mother. 78 The 2003 Act did not prohibit
partial-birth abortions necessary to save the life of the mother, but the
physical complications must be both a direct result of the pregnancy and
life threatening for the partial-birth abortion to be legal. 79
The Court departed from the newly defined stare decisis of Stenberg
and upheld the constitutionality of the 2003 Act even though there was
no health exception to safeguard the mother's life. 80 The majority held
the 2003 Act stood on its own and insisted there were other reasonable
73. Id. at 930.
74. Id. at 931-36. In an attempt to eliminate doubt, it was clearly stated in Stenberg that the test for
evaluating law regulating abortion would be the undue burden test. Id.
75. Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
77. See id. § 1531(b).
78. Partial-Birth Abortion Act of2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
80. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, _, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1636-38 (2007).
20091
122 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:10 9
Cite as: ... U.S. _ (2011)
Opinion of the Court
alternatives for women seeking a second trimester abortion.81 There-
fore, in the Court's eyes, there was no need for a health exception in
this federal statute regulating abortion.8 2
Although the 2003 Act did not explicitly state what type of partial-
birth abortion procedures were prohibited, these facts were important to
ascertain because they weighed in the decision of determining whether
the 2003 Act placed an undue burden on a woman's right to an abor-
tion.83 The D&X procedures were typically performed only when the
fetus' skull was too large to fit through the cervix and were very rarely
performed. Whether or not the 2003 Act passed the undue burden test
hinged on whether the 2003 Act applied to all D&E procedures, or in-
stead only to intact D&E procedures.8 4 If the 2003 Act applied to all
types of D&E procedures, it would place an undue burden on a woman
because D&Es are the most prevalent abortion procedure performed in
the second trimester.85 We found no complications with the undue bur-
den test and held that the 2003 Act only applied to intact D&Es.8 6 Be-
cause it included only intact D&Es, the 2003 Act
did not constitute an undue burden and thus, satisfied constitutional stan-
dards.87
In sum, when this Court laid the foundation for abortion jurisprudence
in 1973 and declared the right for women to choose an abortion, one
could have anticipated the challenges and questioning of that law. State
after state enacted legislation attempting to regulate abortion. The con-
tinuous challenges to the Roe doctrine made it clear that this Court
served as a legal battleground for a political debate. Instead of putting
the issue aside, we followed the challenges and questioning of the Roe
81. Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1636-37.
82. Id.; 127 S.Ct. at 1637-38.
83. Id.; 127 S.Ct. at 1619-20.
84. Id.; 127 S.Ct. at 1627.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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doctrine, until what remained was a much-degraded doctrine, barely re-
sembling the landmark case of Roe v. Wade. Without a clear method,
test, standard, or means of evaluating attempts to regulate abortion,
there can be no predictability and reliability in abortion jurisprudence.
In no other case is this more evident than Roe. Continuous changes,
numerous questions, and several insults created doubt in the stability and
underlying constitutional principles in Roe.
This doubt carried through Roe and into its progeny. In Casey we
were confronted by our own jurisprudence while the delicate state of
abortion law hung in the balance. Did Casey overrule Roe, or did Web-
ster? The joint opinion in Casey wanted people to believe Roe was re-
tained and reaffirmed, 88 but such retention is impossible to effectuate by
changing the doctrine. Chief Justice Rehnquist saw through the muck of
abortion jurisprudence and called the Casey opinion's bluff by declaring,
"Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western
movie set exists: a mere fagade to give the illusion of reality. '89
In application, Roe and its progeny proved to be unreliable and un-
predictable. This unpredictability is best demonstrated in the partial-
birth abortion cases. There is no way to reconcile Stenberg and
Carhart. Each case concerned statutes attempting to regulate partial-
birth abortion procedures. Neither statute provided a health exception
to protect the life of the mother, and both statutes restricted a woman's
right to access certain abortion procedures. On the one hand, the Ne-
braska state statute was unconstitutional because it did not provide a
health exception and failed the undue burden test by limiting women to
only certain types of available procedures. On the other hand, the 2003
Act regulating similar partial-birth abortion procedures was upheld, al-
though it also contained no health exception and restricted certain types
of available abortion procedures. Where our own jurisprudence is mired
in inconsistency, creating only doubt, we must depart from stare decisis.
The time has come for us to abandon this hopeless enterprise and to
abandon the ruling that began it all-Roe v. Wade.
88. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
89. Id. at 954.
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III
We are left with only the claim that stare decisis keeps us from aban-
doning Roe at this late date, and consideration of that doctrine is appro-
priate in light of our decision today. Stare decisis is not a mandate we
must follow. The value of this doctrine is highlighted by Justice
Brandeis's statement:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious con-
cern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its prior decisions.
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physi-
cal sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function. 90
Justice Brandeis's stated departure from stare decisis would be proper
when the precedent never produced a settled workable doctrine and the
moral and political concerns of the issue trumped efforts by the Court to
follow stare decisis. The Roe doctrine has proved a useful tool, by which
this Court has made legislative correction difficult, as was evident in the
analysis of Stenberg and Carhart. What exactly must legislation pro-
hibit or regulate for it to pass the inconsistent undue burden test? If
these questions were raised, then it indicated Roe was not a settled legal
doctrine and was, and remains, intrinsically too complicated to apply in
any consistent manner. It has proved to be "unworkable" and we have
consistently taken it
upon ourselves to tweak the doctrine in ways that suit a particular case,
while leaving the Roe doctrine intact. 91
We approach whether the Roe doctrine should be removed from the
wealth of abortion jurisprudence because of moral and political concerns.
90. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
91. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (plurality opinion) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
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There exists an inherent need to step away from this decision because
after years of erosion, there remains little, if any, consistent legal analy-
sis in the Roe doctrine. Abortion rights demand predictability and reli-
ability if for no other reason than "[a]n entire generation has come of
age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of
women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions .... ,,92
The American people continued to look toward this Court to resolve
and regulate the remaining questions from Roe and its progeny. We
have been unsuccessful in doing so.
In Casey, a plurality of Justices contended that the Roe doctrine must
stand solely because of stare decisis.93 Without a doubt, stare decisis de-
mands respect for settled legal doctrine, but it cannot apply to decisions
like Roe, which never achieved the reliability and predictability com-
manded by settled legal doctrine. In Casey, Justice O'Connor battled the
topic of stare decisis as a vehicle to reaffirm Roe. She praised Justice
Cardozo for his insight on the judicial system and its lack of efficiency if
every case had to be examined with fresh eyes, 94 yet this occurred al-
most every time we granted certiorari and applied the Roe doctrine.
Each time the Roe doctrine has been changed, criticized, or flat out
overruled. 95 The value of stare decisis was abandoned long ago in abor-
tion jurisprudence. We remove this doctrine from the shelf in an at-
tempt for a more appropriate branch of government to determine the
law of abortion.
IV
To be clear, by overruling Roe v. Wade we do not hold that abortion
is unconstitutional. Instead we hold that abortion is not a fundamental
right afforded protection under the Constitution. Thus, the States are
92. Id. at 860.
93. Id. at 854-69; Id. at 912 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 924-25
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see also
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983).
94. Id. at 854 (plurality opinion) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 149 (1921)).
95. Cf id. at 869-73.
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free to enact legislation supporting their legitimate interest in protect-
ing the life of the fetus, whether through abortion regulations such as in-
formed consent, waiting periods, or the prohibition of procedures, like
partial-birth abortions, or even the prohibition of abortion in its en-
tirety. We agree with Justice White's dissent in Doe that abortion
"should be left with the people and to the political processes the people
have devised to govern their affairs. ' 96 It is clear that the American
people should have the choice to vote and exercise the democracy they
love in the abortion debate. 97 With this decision, we bring an epic end
to the burning fire of abortion jurisprudence by putting out the flame
once and for all. Issues of life and death are most suited for the State
realm, where political compromise is possibly and arguably necessary for
both sides of the issue. It is time we stop electing presidential candidates
based on their abortion platform and move on to other issues. Further,
on a selfish note: one hopes this decision will cease to "obscure[] . . .
the selection of Justices to this Court .... ,,98
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is re-
versed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
96. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1000 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stat-
ing famously, "[Tihe American people love democracy and the American people are not fools.").
98. Id. at 995.
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring
in the judgment.
I join the Court in Part I, II-A, III, and IV of the final decision in
overruling Roe v. Wade. As to Part II-B, I concur that Roe should be
overruled and abortion regulation belongs to the States-not this Court.
States have a valid interest in regulating-even prohibiting-a woman's
attempt to end the life of her unborn baby. With this interest, I believe
it not only appropriate, but also imperative that a case of this magni-
tude be examined directly. 99 In other words, Roe should be overruled on
the merits of the decision and solely on the merits of such. The plural-
ity takes the easy road by creatively arguing around a jurisprudence of
doubt that serves only to implicitly reject Roe on the merits. Roe and
its progeny were wrongly decided because a woman's right to end the life
of her unborn baby is not afforded constitutional protection; viability is
an ever-changing standard, inappropriate as a constitutional measure;
and the undue burden test failed to produce any understanding of the
doctrine and its use. I address each of these issues in turn.
A
The right to an abortion was not explicitly enumerated in the Consti-
tution and, as such, was not a right protected by the Constitution or one
that could be embedded in the right to privacy. It would be judicial ac-
tivism to continue to endorse this clearly erroneous concept. The right
to privacy and its extension to abortion were conceived before the rul-
ing in Roe v. Wade.100 Although it remains unclear where the right to
99. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
100. Chief Justice Earl Warren publicly embraced including abortion in the right to privacy. In oral
arguments for Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Chief Justice Warren proposed that a
constitutional right to privacy would extend to the right to an abortion. Thomas Emerson, in response
to the Chief Justice's question stated that the constitutional right of access to contraceptives would not
directly lead to the right to an abortion. Chief Justice Warren clearly disagreed and stood by this
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abortion derives its initial constitutional underpinnings, it was under-
stood that somewhere in the Constitution, the right to privacy pro-
tected a woman's right to abort. In a span of two cases, the Court found
that the right to privacy may exist in no less than six constitutional
amendments, but no one was exactly sure where. Justice Scalia stated
that the Court substituted its own moral judgment for that of "reasoned
judgment" in Casey when trying to connect a constitutional approach to
the right to abort. 10 1 Buzz words such as "person's most basic decision,"
"central to personal dignity and autonomy," "intimate relationships,"
and "too intimate and personal for state interference" 10 2 do not upon
themselves derive constitutional meaning even though they reach to our
core and demand moral acceptance. 103
B
The decision in Roe failed to acknowledge the advancements in medi-
cal technology affecting the ever increasing status of viability outside
the womb. Viability is fundamental to the holding in Roe and that is
where the problem occurs. It was only after the point of viability that
the State would have a compelling interest in protecting the unborn
baby. This compelling interest centers around viability because viability
was universally understood as the time a baby would have meaningful life
outside the womb of the mother. 10 4  Even more alarming, Justice
proposition even though his opinion in Griswold was not published. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 239 (1985); Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in
Search ofa Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, 232 (1965).
101. Casey, 505 U.S. at 982-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 983.
103. This Court has held other acts unconstitutional that would meet the qualification of "reasoned
judgment" to be afforded protection. Id. at 984. These include polygamy, adult incest, and even sui-
cide, which are proscribed by law and not declared to be fundamental rights. Id. The difference, as
Justice Scalia suggested in Casey, is that society has laws proscribing these behaviors. Id. It would be
outside the scope of this decision to decide whether abortion should be a right proscribed by law, but it
is duly noted that the difference between these issues is a fine line of public acceptance of moral be-
havior.
104. The Court does not go anywhere near addressing the baby as a life because it would raise other
issues the Court is not ready to address-mainly, when life begins or whether the baby should be af-
forded the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. But these questions are answered by the Court's
position on viability, as if one takes the position that the Court was not protecting the Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of the baby by drawing a line at viability, then whom was the Court
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O'Connor acknowledged in Casey that since 1973, "advances in neona-
tal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier. But these
facts ... have no bearing on the validity of Roe's central holding, that
viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal
life is constitutionally adequate." 1°5 But when was viability? By its ordi-
nary meaning, viability meant "the mere possibility (not the certainty)
of survivability outside the womb. ' 10 6 For an element of a doctrine so
crucial as to purport constitutional meaning on a right to abortion, vi-
ability could not be based on a changing standard. It was impossible to
ground a substantial body of law on a principle of viability that was in-
herently variable.
C
The third problem with the Roe doctrine was that the undue burden
test failed to produce any understanding of the doctrine and its use. Jus-
tice Scalia best articulated the confusion after the Court's useless clarifi-
cation of an undue burden in Casey: "[d]efining an 'undue burden' as an
'undue hindrance' (or a 'substantial obstacle') hardly 'clarifies' the test.
Consciously or not, the joint opinion's verbal shell game will conceal
raw judicial policy choices concerning what was 'appropriate' abortion
legislation." 107 The undue burden test allowed judges to consider each
abortion regulation and then to substitute his or her own personal opin-
ion about whether or not there was a "substantial obstacle" in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion. I echo the reluctance of the plurality
to support the undue burden test because nearly every regulation on
abortion sets out to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. Whether informed consent, 108 waiting periods, 10 9
protecting?
105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (citations omitted).
106. Webster, 492 U.S. at 536-37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
107. Casey, 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
108. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (holding the government
may require written informed consents to abortions); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 446 (1983) (upholding informed consent requirements as long as they are the
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or fetal viability tests, 110 the fact remains that all abortion regulations
set out to place an obstacle in the path of a woman. These types of
regulations served to second-guess a woman's choice to end her preg-
nancy. As if the choice were not difficult enough to reach on her own, a
woman must now be fully informed about the viability of her baby and
wait before receiving an abortion. There was just no way to reconcile
the chaos created by the undue burden test, and it was indeed a standard
"not built to last." '111
D
In sum, with the majority overruling Roe as an attempt to rid Ameri-
can abortion jurisprudence of continuing doubt, I agree but overrule Roe
on its merits. In addressing whether Roe was correctly decided, I de-
velop the idea that abortion is not a fundamental right afforded protec-
tion under the Constitution. In doing so, the proper venue for abortion
same for other surgical procedures).
109. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Court de-
clared waiting periods unconstitutional, but when applying the undue burden test in Casey, the Court
changed its mind and upheld the constitutionality of a twenty-four hour waiting period stating, "under
the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth
over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest. And while the waiting period
does limit a physician's discretion, that is not, standing alone, a reason to invalidate it." Casey, 505
U.S. at 886.
110. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517 (upholding the constitutionality of a state law requiring testing and
evaluation of fetal viability for all abortions performed after the twentieth week of pregnancy, even
with information that this type of test will increase the cost of an abortion).
111. Casey, 505 U.S. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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regulation is within the States for the people to decide. In discussing
whether Roe created a successful body of law, the plurality opinion over-
rules Roe only on the premise that the doctrine did nothing but create a
"jurisprudence of doubt." The Roe doctrine was maligned and altered
from the first case after Roe. The decision produced no workable doc-
trine and even today, after subsequent changes in the trimester ap-
proach, the standard of an undue burden demonstrated that not even
changes could create a workable Roe doctrine. It has been a long road
for the Roe doctrine, and with this decision the issue rests with the
States where they can learn from our past mistakes and listen to the
people to enact appropriate abortion regulating legislation.
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JUSTICE SCALIA filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE ALITO
joined.
Many may expect this opinion to follow my other "I-told-you-so"
concurring opinions foreshadowing the end of the Roe doctrine and how
it should be overruled. Today, the Court dismisses Roe v. Wade because
the doctrine has been severely eroded by subsequent cases, undermining
the reliability and predictability so vital to the rule of law. Yet, in this
decision, the Court ironically has created more doubt when setting con-
stitutional precedent.
The problem with the Roe doctrine was not Roe itself. The holding
in Roe was clear: regulation of abortions before the third trimester was
unconstitutional. The jurisprudence of doubt the Court finds so disturb-
ing was created after the decision in Roe. It was the Court's subsequent
attempts to water down the Roe doctrine that led to the problem we
face today. The Court should overrule all subsequent cases that changed
the Roe doctrine and restore abortion jurisprudence to that initially es-
tablished in Roe. Doing so would eliminate all the doubt created by sub-
sequent jurisprudence, and it would solve the dilemma the plurality
thought was so pressing as to overrule Roe.
I dissent from the Court's cowardly approach in overruling Roe v.
Wade. Perversely, the Court contends that overruling nearly forty years
of precedent would clear up any jurisprudence of doubt. The result is just
the opposite. In overruling Roe, the Court essentially teaches us that
losers in court should undermine a court's decision everywhere they can.
Perhaps, after continuous wear on the Court, they will prevail, as they
have done today. Throwing the issue to the States on a contrived basis
of "clearing the issue of any doubt" fails; it will only serve to fuel the
very fire the majority sought to extinguish.
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JUSTICE GINSBURG filed a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE SOUTER
joined.
Never has the Court so blatantly manipulated the law in its favor.
The manipulation is chock full of moral and religious perversion. The
plurality wants us to believe that the problem with abortion is not the
lack of constitutional protection, but that it is a decision the Court does
not agree a woman should have the right to make. That certainly is not
legal justification. As we have seen, the Court embraces and promotes
certain liberties not stated in the Constitution, such as marriage and pro-
creation. What is so different with abortion? Justice Rehnquist states,
"[u]nlike marriage, procreation, and contraception, abortion 'involves
the purposeful termination of a potential life."'' 112 This is a "eureka"
moment. There is no legal battle with abortion. By refusing to ac-
knowledge any protection under the Bill of Rights, the Court serves its
self interests by imposing its own moral views upon the American peo-
ple. Since the law cannot operate to eliminate abortion, the Court dis-
guises its own moral decisions as law.
Today's plurality decision lacks any discussion of not only the case
before it, but also any analysis of Roe on the merits. Forty years of
precedent and a case of Roe's historic disposition demands more than a
dismissal as nothing more than a continuing annoyance. It is under-
standable that the Court is discouraged with the ever-changing standard
of abortion jurisprudence, but the fact remains that Roe deserves more
than just a passing glance. For that reason, I join Justice Scalia's dissent
that overruling Roe without examining the merits of the case furthers
the notion of a "jurisprudence of doubt." I write separately to reexam-
ine how Roe was discussed on the merits and to show the Court that the
Roe doctrine reflects a core constitutional value of a reliable and pre-
dictable doctrine. Furthermore, the result of leaving abortion solely in
the hands of State regulation takes away a woman's control of her own
destiny. Overruling Roe disregards precedent and the principles of stare
112. Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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decisis this Court claims to cherish and respect. I cannot join the Court
in its decision today-I dissent from its unreasonable disposition.
The Court did not, nor could it, deny the right to privacy; therefore,
the concurrence of Chief Justice Roberts is ludicrous to even assert that
if a constitutional protection is not explicitly enumerated in the Consti-
tution then it does not exist. Yet, constitutional support exists in sev-
eral amendments, and this support serves to bolster the argument that
abortion is a fundamental right. The debate is moot regarding whether
the First, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendment holds the right to privacy
sheltering abortion-the fact remains that the protection exists. Sec-
ondly, it is a well-established principle that a major goal of the Constitu-
tion is to protect individual liberties. I concede the notion that abortion
was not an individual liberty the framers intended to protect. However,
the Constitution has the insight, and indeed the power, to confer rights
above those enumerated in the Constitution-is this not the beauty of
the Ninth Amendment? 113
A survey of a random sample of the American people from any place
in the United States would reveal that nearly all of these people believe
they have a right to privacy. Fundamental to the right to privacy is a
safeguard from government intrusion on our most private lives. Yet,
nowhere in the Constitution is this right to privacy explicitly stated. If
we were to follow the constitutional principles of the concurring opin-
ion, as well as those opinions repeatedly expressed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas in other abortion cases,
then many rights that we as Americans hold near and dear to our hearts
would not be afforded constitutional protection simply because they are
not explicitly stated in the Constitution. These rights include not only
the right to privacy, but the right to marry and the right to procreate. 114
113. Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky notes that the power behind the Ninth Amendment is
that "the framers might have been fearful that enumerating some rights could be taken as implicitly
denying the existence of other liberties. Thus, the Ninth Amendment ... declares: 'The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."' ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 5 (3d ed. 2006);
see U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
114. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court first recognized marriage as a fundamental
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I can think of no right other than abortion that blends ideas of per-
sonal and family privacy with that of autonomy, including freedom of
thought, belief, and intimate conduct.1 15 A woman's right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy is deeply personal. It involves not only her
bodily integrity, but also includes decisions of family planning not only
in the present moment but also those to be made in the future. The
freedom of thought and belief is absolutely certain for any woman mak-
ing decisions about what is appropriate for her body, her life. Time and
time again this Court misses the point even when it is right in front of
it. I propose that the problem with abortion jurisprudence is not the
analysis of the issue, but rather how the Court approaches the topic of
abortion. The issue is not whether to obtain an abortion, but the right
to choose to have an abortion. The distinction is critical. The right to
choose is about a woman making a decision for herself and is not limited
to abortion; however, the law must afford women all safe and available
options so she can make the best decision. Today's decision tells
women that the right to choose what is best is not a decision they are
capable of making-instead, the decision is one that belongs in the
hands of the State. It is nothing short of government regulation of
women's bodies by taking the decision away from the individual.
Overruling Roe will not stop women from obtaining abortions. It
only serves to widen the economic gap in women's health care. Women
with financial support will have the means to travel elsewhere to obtain
an abortion. Women without the means will resort to desperate meas-
ures. Today's decision prevents women from gaining access to safe and
right protected under the liberty interest of the due process clause. 388 U.S. at 12. The Court de-
clared: "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival. Id. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987) (finding a Missouri marriage regulation impermissibly burdened the constitutional right of pris-
oners to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (finding a Wisconsin statute impinged on
the right to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (discussing the relationship between
marriage and due process). The right to procreate was embraced in the 1942 case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), which held that "[t]his case touches a sensitive and important issue of
human rights ... a right which is basic to perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring." 316
U.S. at 536.
115. Justice Kennedy explained the notions of liberty in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003):
"Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct." 539 U.S. at 652.
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affordable abortion. The plurality creates a sense of false hope by turn-
ing to state regulation of abortion. It seems as if they are offering an
olive branch, saying, "Look, we did not declare abortion unconstitu-
tional. We just left that for the States to decide." The trouble with the
Court's laziness is that the States do not have laws consistent with this
opinion.
An analysis of the current abortion legislation enacted in all fifty
states reveals that few states would immediately feel the impact of to-
day's
decision. 116 Most states have either "repealed their [abortion] laws or
amended [them] to conform to Roe v. Wade." '117  Only three states-
Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Utah-enacted legislation after Roe chal-
lenging the authority of this Court in attempts to prohibit some or most
forms of abortion. 118 Even worse is the idea that today's decisions will
send States into a legislative panic to enforce laws regulating abortion.
Quickly drafted legislation paired with a highly controversial topic is a
recipe for disaster. This Court recognizes: "[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly
shaped, experience teaches, may prove unstable. The most prominent
example in recent decades is Roe v. Wade."119 Have we come full circle
with the premise behind a jurisprudence of doubt?
The irony of today's decision is clear. While the Court believes it
settled the jurisprudence of doubt surrounding abortion law, the evidence
indicates it has in fact created a jurisprudence of doubt concerning other
constitutionally protected rights. To echo the words of Justice Black-
mun: "I fear for the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." 120
The only jurisprudence of doubt resolved by this decision is that abor-
tion law, and indeed the doctrine set forth in Roe v. Wade, requires a de-
tailed and thoughtful reexamination. Today's opinion will not silence
116. Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status ofAbortion in the States ifRoe v. Wade is Overruled, 23
IsSUES L. & MED. 3, 3 (2007).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 38. These statutes are currently unenforceable-until this decision is rendered-because
federal courts have declared them unconstitutional. Id.
119. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992).
120. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (expressing pure displeasure in the Court after the ruling in Webster did not give the
Roe doctrine the attention and respect it deserves).
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the issue of abortion before this Court.
In conclusion, today's decision marks a dark day for this Court. It is
clear that the moral and religious fervor of this Court is greater than the
law and a woman's right to privacy. The victims of today's opinion,
the women of the United States, must now accept government regula-
tion of their bodies and acknowledge that the State now determines what
is best for her and her unborn fetus. This gigantic step back in women's
health does not clear the
jurisprudence of doubt or even create a more reliable and workable
standard. The decision in Roe was properly decided, and it was the duty
of this Court to stand behind that decision. I remain hopeful for the day
when the Court understands the error of this decision and sets to correct
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